The Israeli army has announced a significant victory in northern Gaza, claiming to have “dismantled” Hamas’s military framework in the area. While the Israeli military spokesman, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, released a list of Hamas commanders killed, suggesting that 12 battalions were rendered headless and out of battle, the situation is more complex than a simple “Israeli victory/Hamas defeat.”
Hamas undoubtedly suffered heavy losses during the prolonged Israeli offensive, which utilized superior technology and numbers. It is also likely that a significant number of commanders and deputies were killed. Israel strategically targets Qassam Brigades units by focusing on their commanders using precision rockets fired from helicopters and drones. However, Hamas has long been aware of this tactic and operates on the principle that each commander has at least one trained deputy ready to step up in their absence. Consequently, units are rarely “headless” for long periods.
There is a fundamental difference in the way the Israeli army and the Qassam Brigades operate on the battlefield. Israel follows a classical military structure, with each unit or battle group having allocated tasks, resources, and areas of responsibility. Israeli unit commanders have a high level of independence to exploit military opportunities without waiting for approval from headquarters. In contrast, Hamas forces prioritize secrecy, command chain protection, and maximum separation of units. While Hamas battalions may lack precise coordination, they can still operate under their last set of coordinated orders if higher command is lost.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses that the Northern Brigade and the Gaza Brigade of Hamas are “degraded” but far from destroyed. Out of the 12 battalions, ISW lists eight as “degraded,” three as “combat ineffective,” and only one as “combat effective.” This suggests that while Hamas has been weakened, they remain capable of putting up a fight, particularly in defense.
Despite claims from various sources, the Israeli army has never openly stated that Hamas forces in the north have been destroyed. They have used terms like “elimination of senior commanders” and “dismantling,” but not “destruction” or “defeat.” In modern warfare, units rarely cease to exist completely. Instead, sensible commanders opt to disengage when they realize they are at a significant disadvantage or their supplies and support are compromised. This allows them to save their forces, regroup, and join other units.
In all likelihood, Hamas command decided to disengage and reform in northern Gaza, recognizing the diminishing effectiveness of separate pockets of defense against overwhelming force. Using the tunnels still under their control, several thousand Hamas fighters likely retreated over several days to central and south zones of the Strip, where they will reinforce the remaining three full brigades.
While the Israeli army may claim a victory in northern Gaza, it is important to recognize that Hamas remains a threat. Their ability to adapt and reorganize, combined with their determination to defend, means that the conflict is far from over. The situation in Gaza continues to be a volatile and complex issue that requires careful consideration and analysis.
