Asymmetric warfare has proven to be bloodier and more savage than traditional conflicts, and the ongoing fighting between the Israeli army and Hamas in Gaza serves as a prime example. This asymmetrical battle will undoubtedly be studied by strategists and tacticians alike. While the term “asymmetric warfare” is relatively new, the concept itself is much older, often pitting significantly unequal enemies against one another, creating a David versus Goliath scenario. In these conflicts, non-state combatants are often denied the protections granted to recognized combatants under international conventions and laws of war. Consequently, the stronger party may resort to tactics and weaponry that would be deemed unacceptable in a conventional war. In response, the weaker side commits acts that are legally questionable, driven by their desire to be recognized as equals.
Over the past half-century, numerous wars, both civil and otherwise, have showcased asymmetric warfare, including Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. While not traditionally considered an asymmetrical conflict, the ongoing war in Ukraine against Russia demonstrates important elements of this type of warfare. When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, it inherited an outdated army structure reminiscent of the Soviet Union. However, it became apparent that to effectively combat Russia, Ukraine needed to modernize its tactics and strategies. To achieve this, Ukraine decided to adopt NATO standards, believing them to be superior to Soviet-style practices. Yet, transforming a large and bureaucratic system takes time, as demonstrated by Israel and other armies. Therefore, the Ukrainian leadership took the first step towards implementing the new doctrines by allowing tactical initiative and independence among their smaller, highly autonomous units.
This decision ultimately saved Ukraine from a swift defeat when Russia launched its proxy attack in 2014, culminating in the occupation of Crimea. The Ukrainian army, particularly its battalion-sized and smaller units, embraced ingenuity and innovation to gain an advantage. Notably, the use of small, inexpensive commercial drones revolutionized their tactics. These highly mobile squads, armed with $200 drones commonly found among children, gained a significant speed advantage. By launching drones to gather intelligence on the enemy’s position, they could adapt their attack or defense strategies in real-time. Their Russian opponents, on the other hand, were hindered by a slow and cumbersome process of requesting reconnaissance assets from higher units, causing delays in decision-making.
Taking their tactics a step further, Ukrainian forces began arming the hand-held drones. Within days of the Russian attack, Ukrainian engineers transformed these drones into “poor man’s pilotless bombers” by attaching small bombs. These bombs, weighing just a few kilograms, became highly effective against Russian artillery crews, causing significant casualties. Videos of these small drones dropping bomblets on soldiers flooded the internet, instilling fear among Russian troops. Emboldened by their initial success, Ukrainian forces even targeted Russian armored vehicles. Tanks, designed to withstand ground-level attacks, proved vulnerable to bomblets dropped from above. The cost of a drone-bomblet system amounted to a few thousand dollars, while a single tank cost several million dollars. The Ukrainian forces had found a cost-effective solution to counter their stronger adversary.
To counter these asymmetrical attacks, two approaches emerged: active protection, such as jamming enemy drone frequencies, rendering them useless, or utilizing anti-drone weapons. However, a more cost-effective and simpler solution was passive protection, involving the addition of a “roof” on tanks. This simple metal frame, equipped with a hard-wire mesh, prevented drone bombs from damaging the tanks upon impact. Despite its simplicity and affordability, it took the Russian military months to recognize the effectiveness of this solution and implement it. Strikingly, the similarities between the Ukrainian army’s strategies and the Israeli army’s approach in Gaza are apparent. As Israeli forces enter Gaza, videos released by Hamas demonstrate the efficiency of bomblet attacks, with only a small percentage of Israeli tanks equipped with protective “roofs.” This indicates that decisions to implement such simple and cost-effective solutions still require approval and coordination through the chain of command.
While technical and tactical innovations have not yet won the war for Ukraine, they have significantly hindered the enemy’s progress and inflicted heavy casualties. Implementing similar weapons and methods may not entirely defend Gaza City against massive Israeli attacks, but it will undoubtedly prolong and intensify the conflict. The ongoing battles in Ukraine and Gaza serve as compelling examples of the power and effectiveness of asymmetric warfare. The lessons learned from these conflicts will undoubtedly shape future strategies and tactics in similar scenarios.
